Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «Clearly the pressures for convergence indicate the former but the forces of divergence and indigenization suggest the contrary»

jdact

A new kind of world

«(…) Take globalization as an example. The dominant Western view has been that globalization is a process by which the rest of the world becomes, and should become, increasingly Westernized, with the adoption of free markets, the import of Western capital, privatization, the rule of law, human rights regimes and democratic norms. Much political effort, indeed, has been expended by the West towards this end. Competition, the market and technology, meanwhile, have been powerful and parallel pressures fostering the kind of convergence and homogeneity which is visible in many developing cities around the world in the form of high-rise buildings, expressways, mobile phones, and much else. There are, however, strong countervailing forces, rooted in the specifi c history and culture of each society, that serve to shape indigenous institutions like the family, the government and the company and which pull in exactly the opposite direction. Furthermore, as countries grow more prosperous they become increasingly self-confident about their own culture and history, and thereby less inclined to ape the West. Far from being a one-way process, globalization is rather more complex: the United States may have been the single most influential player, exerting enormous power in successive rounds of global trade talks, for example, but the biggest winner has been East Asia and the greatest single benefi ciary China. The process of globalization involves an unending tension between on the one hand the forces of convergence, including Western political pressure, and on the other hand the counter-trend towards divergence and indigenization.

Prior to 1960, the West and Japan enjoyed a huge economic advantage over the rest of the world, which still remained largely agrarian in character, but since then a gamut of developing countries have closed the gap with the West, especially those in East Asia. As a consequence, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between the developed world and the more advanced parts of the developing world: South Korea and Taiwan, for example, are now to be counted as developed. But as countries reach Western levels of development, do they become more like the West, or less like the West, or perhaps paradoxically a combination of the two? Clearly the pressures for convergence indicate the former but the forces of divergence and indigenization suggest the contrary.

Previously, the overarching difference between the developed and the developing world was the huge disparity in their levels of economic development. It is only with the arrival of these countries at the lower reaches of Western levels of development that the question of convergence or divergence becomes pertinent. There has been an assumption by the Western mainstream that there is only one way of being modern, which involves the adoption of Western-style institutions, values, customs and beliefs, such as the rule of law, the free market and democratic norms. This, one might add, is an attitude typically held by peoples and cultures who regard themselves as more developed and more civilized than others: that progress for those who are lower down on the developmental scale involves them becoming more like those who are higher up». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

 JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,

Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «… first granted to US government debt when it was assessed in 1917, unless it took radical action to curb government expenditure»

jdact

The Changing of the Guard. O Render da Guarda

«(…) In the long run at least, it is a merciless measure. Notwithstanding this, imperial powers in decline are almost invariably in denial of the fact. That was the case with Britain from 1918 onwards and, to judge by the behaviour of the Bush administration (though perhaps not Obama’s), which failed to read the runes, preferring to believe that the US was about to rule the world in a new American century when the country was actually in decline and on the eve of a world in which it would fi nd its authority considerably diminished, the US may well make the same mistake, perhaps on a much grander scale. The financial meltdown in 2008 belatedly persuaded a growing number of American commentators that the United States might after all be in decline, but that was still a far cry from a general recognition of the extent and irreversibility of that decline and how it might diminish American power and infl uence in the future. It has been estimated that the total budgetary and economic cost to the United States of the Iraq war will turn out to be around $3 trillion. Even with this level of expenditure, the armed forces have come under huge strain as a result of the war.

Deployments have got steadily longer and redeployments more frequent, retention rates and recruitment standards have fallen, while the army has lost many of its brightest and best, with a remorseless rise in the number of offi cers choosing to leave at the earliest opportunity. Such has been the inordinate cost of the Iraqi occupation that, regardless of political considerations, the financial burden of any similar proposed invasion of Iran, in practice likely to be much higher, would always have been too large: for military as well as political reasons, the Bush administration was unable to seriously contemplate similar military action against Iran and North Korea, the other two members of its axis of evil. The United States is, thus, already beginning to face the classic problems of imperial overreach.

The burden of maintaining a huge global military presence, with over 800 American bases dotted around the world, has been one of the causes of the US’s enormous current account deficit, which in 2006 accounted for 6.5 per cent of US GDP. In future the American economy will fi nd it increasingly diffi cult to support such a military commitment. The United States has ceased to be a major manufacturer or a large-scale exporter of manufactured goods, having steadily ceded that position to East Asia. In recent times it has persistently been living beyond its means: the government has been spending more than it saves, households have been doing likewise, and since 1982, apart from one year, the country has been buying more from foreigners than it sells to them, with a consequent huge current account deficit and a growing volume of IOUs. Current account deficits can of course be rectified, but only by reducing growth and accepting a lower level of economic activity. Growing concern on the part of foreign institutions about these deficits led to a steady fall in the value of the dollar until 2008, and this could well be resumed at some point, further threatening the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency and American financial power. The credit rating agency Moody’s warned in 2008 that the US faced the prospect within a decade of losing its top-notch triple-A credit rating, first granted to US government debt when it was assessed in 1917, unless it took radical action to curb government expenditure». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,

Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «We are so used to the world being Western, even American, that we have little idea what it would be like if it was not»

jdact

The Changing of the Guard. O Render da Guarda

«(…) And this was before the fi nancial meltdown in 2008, which, with the huge taxpayer-funded government bail-out of the fi nancial sector, will greatly increase the size of the US national debt. This is not to suggest that, in the short run, the US will be required to reduce its military expenditure for reasons of fi nancial restraint: indeed, given the position that the US military occupies in the national psyche, and the primary emphasis that US foreign policy has traditionally placed on militar power, this seems most unlikely. Being an imperial power, however, is a hugely expensive business and, peering into the future, as its relative economic power declines, the United States will no longer be able to sustain the military commitments and military superiority that it presently enjoys.

A new kind of world

We stand on the eve of a different kind of world, but comprehending it is difficult: we are so accustomed to dealing with the paradigms and param eters of the contemporary world that we inevitably take them for granted, believing that they are set in concrete rather than themselves being the subject of longer-run cycles of historical change. Given that American global hegemony has held sway for almost a lifetime, and that Western supremacy transcends many lifetimes, this is not surprising. We are so used to the world being Western, even American, that we have little idea what it would be like if it was not.

The West, moreover, has a strong vested interest in the world being cast in its image, because this brings multifarious benefi ts. As a matter of course, hegemonic powers seek to project their values and institutions on to subordinate nations and the latter, in response, will, depending on circumstances, adapt or genuflect towards their ways; if they don’t, hegemonic powers generally seek to impose those values and arrangements on them, even in extremis by force. For reasons of both mindset and interest, therefore, the United States, and the West more generally, finds it difficult to visualize, or accept, a world that involves a major and continuing diminution in its influence». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

 Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,

Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «The credit rating agency Moody’s warned in 2008 that the US faced the prospect within a decade of losing its top-notch triple. A credit rating, first granted to US government…»

jdact

The Changing of the Guard. O Render da Guarda

«(…) In the long run at least, it is a merciless measure. Notwithstanding this, imperial powers in decline are almost invariably in denial of the fact. That was the case with Britain from 1918 onwards and, to judge by the behaviour of the Bush administration (though perhaps not Obama’s), which failed to read the runes, preferring to believe that the US was about to rule the world in a new American century when the country was actually in decline and on the eve of a world in which it would find its authority considerably diminished, the US may well make the same mistake, perhaps on a much grander scale. The financial meltdown in 2008 belatedly persuaded a growing number of American commentators that the United States might after all be in decline, but that was still a far cry from a general recognition of the extent and irreversibility of that decline and how it might diminish American power and infl uence in the future.

It has been estimated that the total budgetary and economic cost to the United States of the Iraq war will turn out to be around $3 trillion. Even with this level of expenditure, the armed forces have come under huge strain as a result of the war. Deployments have got steadily longer and redeployments more frequent, retention rates and recruitment standards have fallen, while the army has lost many of its brightest and best, with a remorseless rise in the number of offi cers choosing to leave at the earliest opportunity. Such has been the inordinate cost of the Iraqi occupation that, regardless of political considerations, the financial burden of any similar proposed invasion of Iran, in practice likely to be much higher, would always have been too large: for military as well as political reasons, the Bush administration was unable to seriously contemplate similar military action against Iran and North Korea, the other two members of its axis of evil. The United States is, thus, already beginning to face the classic problems of imperial overreach.

The burden of maintaining a huge global military presence, with over 800 American bases dotted around the world, has been one of the causes of the US’s enormous current account deficit, which in 2006 accounted for 6.5 per cent of US GDP. In future the American economy will find it increasingly difficult to support such a military commitment. The United States has ceased to be a major manufacturer or a large-scale exporter of manufactured goods, having steadily ceded that position to East Asia. In recent times it has persistently been living beyond its means: the government has been spending more than it saves, households have been doing likewise, and since 1982, apart from one year, the country has been buying more from foreigners than it sells to them, with a consequent huge current account deficit and a growing volume of IOUs. Current account deficits can of course be rectified, but only by reducing growth and accepting a lower level of economic activity. Growing concern on the part of foreign institutions about these deficits led to a steady fall in the value of the dollar until 2008, and this could well be resumed at some point, further threatening the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency and American financial power. The credit rating agency Moody’s warned in 2008 that the US faced the prospect within a decade of losing its top-notch triple. A credit rating, first granted to US government debt when it was assessed in 1917, unless it took radical action to curb government expenditure». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,

Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «As Paul Kennedy argued in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, the ability of nations to exercise and sustain global hegemony has ultimately depended on their productive capacity»

jdact

The Changing of the Guard. O Render da Guarda

«(…) Far from the United States presiding over a reshaping of global affairs, however, it rapidly found itself beleaguered in Iraq and enjoying less global support than at any time since 1945. The exercise of overwhelming military power proved of little effect in Iraq but served to squander the reserves of soft power, in Joseph S. Nye’s words, the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies, that the United States had accumulated since 1945. Failing to comprehend the significance of deeper economic trends, as well as misreading the situation in Iraq, the Bush administration overestimated American power and thereby overplayed its hand, with the consequence that its policies had exactly the opposite effect to that which had been intended: instead of enhancing the US’s position in the world, Bush’s foreign policy seriously weakened it. The neo-conservative position represented a catastrophic misreading of history.

Military and political power rest on economic strength. As Paul Kennedy argued in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, the ability of nations to exercise and sustain global hegemony has ultimately depended on their productive capacity. America’s present superpower status is a product of its rapid economic growth between 1870 and 1950 and the fact that during the second half of the twentieth century it was the world’s largest and often most dynamic economy. This economic strength underpinned and made possible its astonishing political, cultural and military power from 1945 onwards. According to the economic historian Angus Maddison, the US economy accounted for 8.8 per cent of global GDP in 1870. There then followed a spectacular period of growth during which the proportion rose to 18.9 per cent in 1913 and 27.3 per cent in 1950. This was followed by a slow and steady decline to 22.1 per cent in 1973, with the figure now hovering around 20 per cent. This still represents a formidable proportion, given that the US accounts for only 4.6 per cent of the world’s population, but the long-run trend is unmistakable. One could make a similar point in relation to Victorian Britain’s imperial reach between 1850 and 1914. This was made possible because Britain accomplished the world’s fi rst industrial revolution and, as a consequence, came to enjoy a big economic lead over all other countries. Compared with the United States, however, whose share of global GDP peaked at 35 per cent in 1944 (albeit in a war-ravaged world), the highest figure for the UK was a much smaller 9 per cent in 1899. The precipitous decline of Britain as a global power over the last half century has been the predictable result of its deteriorating relative economic position, its share of global GDP having sunk to a mere 3.3 per cent by 1998. If Britain took its place alongside the United States in Iraq, its military contribution was largely cosmetic. The precondition for being a hegemonic power, including the ability or otherwise to preside over a formal or informal empire, is economic strength». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

 Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,

Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «… the US’s position in the world, Bush’s foreign policy seriously weakened it. The neo-conservative position represented a catastrophic misreading of history»

jdact

The Changing of the Guard. O Render da Guarda

«(…) According to projections by Goldman Sachs, the three largest economies in the world by 2050 will be China, followed by a closely matched America and India some way behind, and then Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Indonesia. Only two European countries feature in the top ten, namely the UK and Germany in ninth and tenth place respectively. Of the present G7, only four appear in the top ten. In similar forecasts, Pricew ater house Coopers suggest that the Brazilian economy could be larger than Japan’s, and that the Russian, Mexican and Indonesian economies could each be bigger than the German, French and UK economies by 2050. If these projections, or something similar, are borne out in practice, then during the next four decades the world will come to look like a very different place indeed.

Such a scenario was far from people’s minds in 2001. Following 9/11, the United States not only saw itself as the sole superpower but attempted to establish a new global role which refl ected that pre-eminence. The neo-conservative think-tank Project for the New American Century, established in 1997 by, amongst others, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, adopted a statement of principles which articulated the new doctrine and helped prepare the ground for the Bush administration: As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world’s preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces na opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?

In 2004 the infl uential neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer wrote:

On December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union died and something new was born, something utterly new, a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower unchecked by any rival and with decisive reach in every corner of the globe. This is a staggering development in history, not seen since the fall of Rome.

The new century dawned with the world deeply aware of and preoccupied by the prospect of what appeared to be overwhelming American power. The neo-conservatives chose to interpret the world through the prism of the defeat of the Soviet Union and the overwhelming military superiority enjoyed by the United States, rather than in terms of the underlying trend towards economic multipolarity, which was downplayed. The new doctrine placed a premium on the importance of the United States maintaining a huge militar lead over other countries in order to deter potential rivals, and on the US pursuing its own interests rather than being constrained either by its allies or international agreements.In the post-Cold War era, US military expenditure was almost as great as that of all the other nations of the world combined: never in the history of the human race has the military inequality between one nation and all others been so great. The Bush presidency’s foreign policy marked an important shift compared with that of previous administrations: the war on terror became the new imperative, America’s relations with Western Europe were accorded reduced signifi cance, the principle of national sovereignty was denigrated and that of regime-change affi rmed, culminating in the invasion of Iraq. Far from the United States presiding over a reshaping of global affairs, however, it rapidly found itself beleaguered in Iraq and enjoying less global support than at any time since 1945. The exercise of overwhelming military power proved of little effect in Iraq but served to squander the reserves of soft power, in Joseph S. Nye’s words, the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies, that the United States had accumulated since 1945. Failing to comprehend the signifi cance of deeper economic trends, as well as misreading the situation in Iraq, the Bush administration overestimated American power and thereby overplayed its hand, with the consequence that its policies had exactly the opposite effect to that which had been intended: instead of enhancing the US’s position in the world, Bush’s foreign policy seriously weakened it. The neo-conservative position represented a catastrophic misreading of history». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,

Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «The new century dawned with the world deeply aware of and preoccupied by the prospect of what appeared to be overwhelming American power»

jdact

The Changing of the Guard. O Render da Guarda

«(…) According to projections by Goldman Sachs, the three largest economies in the world by 2050 will be China, followed by a closely matched America and India some way behind, and then Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Indonesia Only two European countries feature in the top ten, namely the UK and Germany in ninth and tenth place respectively. Of the present G7, only four appear in the top ten. In similar forecasts, Price water house Coopers suggest that the Brazilian economy could be larger than Japan’s, and that the Russian, Mexican and Indonesian economies could each be bigger than the German, French and UK economies by 2050. If these projections, or something similar, are borne out in practice, then during the next four decades the world will come to look like a very different place indeed.

Such a scenario was far from people’s minds in 2001. Following, the United States not only saw itself as the sole superpower but attempted to establish a new global role which refl ected that pre-eminence. The neo-conservative think-tank Project for the New American Century, established in 1997 by, amongst others, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, adopted a statement of principles which articulated the new doctrine and helped prepare the ground for the Bush administration:

As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world’s preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces na opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?

In 2004 the infl uential neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer wrote:

On December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union died and something new was born, something utterly new, a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower unchecked by any rival and with decisive reach in every corner of the globe. This is a staggering development in history, not seen since the fall of Rome.

The new century dawned with the world deeply aware of and preoccupied by the prospect of what appeared to be overwhelming American power. The neo-conservatives chose to interpret the world through the prism of the defeat of the Soviet Union and the overwhelming military superiority enjoyed by the United States, rather than in terms of the underlying trend towards economic multipolarity, which was downplayed. The new doctrine placed a premium on the importance of the United States maintaining a huge military lead over other countries in order to deter potential rivals, and on the US pursuing its own interests rather than being constrained either by its allies or international agreements.10 In the post-Cold War era, US military expenditure was almost as great as that of all the other nations of the world combined: never in the history of the human race has the military inequality between one nation and all others been so great. The Bush presidency’s foreign policy marked an important shift compared with that of previous administrations: the war on terror became the new imperative, America’s relations with Western Europe were accorded reduced signifi cance, the principle of national sovereignty was denigrated and that of regime-change affirmed, culminating in the invasion of Iraq». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

 Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,

Quando a China Mandar no Mundo. Martin Jacques. «… the effects of latent imperial rivalry between Britain and the United States. For over two centuries the West, first in the form of Europe and subsequently the United States, has dominated the world»

jdact

The Changing of the Guard. O Render da Guarda

«Since 1945 the United States has been the world’s dominant power. Even during the Cold War its economy was far more advanced, and more than twice as large, as that of the Soviet Union, while its military capability and technological sophistication were much superior.1 Following the Second World War, the US was the prime mover in the creation of a range of multinational and global institutions, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and NATO, which were testament to its new-found global power and authority. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 greatly enhanced America’s pre-eminent position, eliminating its main adversary and resulting in the territories and countries of the former Soviet bloc opening their markets and turning in many cases to the US for aid and support.

Never before, not even in the heyday of the British Empire, had a nation’s power enjoyed such a wide reach. The dollar became the world’s preferred currency, with most trade being conducted in it and most reserves held in it. The US dominated all the key global institutions bar the UN, and enjoyed a military presence in every part of the world. Its global position seemed unassailable, and at the turn of the millennium terms like hyperpower and ‘unipolarity’ were coined to describe what appeared to be a new and unique form of power.

The baton of pre-eminence, before being passed to the United States, had been held by Europe, especially the major European nations like Britain, France and Germany, and previously, to a much lesser extent, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. From the beginning of Britain’s Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century until the mid twentieth century, Europe was to shape global history in a most profound manner. The engine of Europe’s dynamism was industrialization and its mode of expansion colonial conquest. Even as Europe’s position began to decline after the First World War, and precipitously after 1945, the fact that America, the new rising power, was a product of European civilization served as a source of empathy and affi nity between the Old World and the New World, giving rise to ties which found expression in the idea of the West2 while serving to mitigate the effects of latent imperial rivalry between Britain and the United States. For over two centuries the West, first in the form of Europe and subsequently the United States, has dominated the world.

We are now witnessing an historic change which, though still relatively in its infancy, is destined to transform the world. The developed world,  which for over a century has meant the West (namely, the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand) plus Japan, is rapidly being overhauled in terms of economic size by the developing world. In 2001 the developed countries accounted for just over half the world’s GDP, compared with around 60 per cent in 1973. It will be a long time, of course, before even the most advanced of the developing countries acquires the economic and technological sophistication of the developed, but because they collectively account for the overwhelming majority of the world’s population and their economic growth rate has been rather greater than that of the developed world, their rise has already resulted in a signifi cant shift in the balance of global economic power.

There have been several contemporary illustrations of this realignment. After declining for over two decades, commodity prices began to increase around the turn of the century, driven by buoyant economic growth in the developing world, above all from China, until the onset of a global recession reversed this trend, at least in the short run. Meanwhile, the stellar economic performance of the East Asian economies, with their resulting huge trade surpluses, has enormously swollen their foreign exchange reserves. A proportion of these have been invested, notably in the case of China and Singapore, in state-controlled sovereign wealth funds whose purpose is to seek profi table investments in other countries, including the West. Commodity-producing countries, notably the oil-rich states in the Middle East, have similarly invested part of their newly expanded income in such funds. Sovereign wealth funds acquired powerful new leverage as a result of the credit crunch, commanding resources which the major Western fi nancial institutions palpably lacked. The meltdown of some of Wall Street’s largest fi nancial institutions in September 2008 underlined the shift in economic power from the West, with some of the fallen giants seeking support from sovereign wealth funds and the US government stepping in to save the mortgage titans Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae partly in order to reassure countries like China, which had invested huge sums of money in them: if they had withdrawn these, it would almost certainly have precipitated a colapse in the value of the dollar. The fi nancial crisis has graphically illustrated the disparity between an East Asia cash-rich from decades of surpluses and a United States cash-poor following many years of deficits». In Martin Jacques, Quando a China Mandar no Mundo, 2009, 2012, Temas e Debates, Círculo de Leitores, ISBN 978-989-644-196-8, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-713-992-540.

Cortesia de TeDebates/CdeLeitores/PenguinB/JDACT

JDACT, Martin Jacques, Literatura, Economia, China, Conhecimento,